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We demonstrate that sharply diﬀerent policy choices across democ-
racies can be explained as a consequence of diﬀerences in the ability of
political competitors to make credible pre-electoral commitments to vot-
ers. Politicians can overcome their credibility deﬁcit in two ways. First,
they can build reputations. This requires that they fulﬁll preconditions
that in practice are costly: informing voters of their promises; tracking
those promises; ensuring that voters turn out on election day. Alterna-
tively, they can rely on intermediaries — patrons — who are already able
to make credible commitments to their clients. Endogenizing credibility
in this way, we ﬁnd that targeted transfers and corruption are higher and
public good provision lower than in democracies in which political com-
petitors can make credible pre-electoral promises. We also argue that in
the absence of political credibility, political reliance on patrons enhances
welfare in the short-run, in contrast to the traditional view that clientelism
in politics is a source of signiﬁcant policy distortion. However, in the long
run reliance on patrons may undermine the emergence of credible polit-
ical parties. The model helps to explain several puzzles. For example,
public investment and corruption are higher in young democracies than
old; and democratizing reforms succeeded remarkably in Victorian Eng-
land, in contrast to the more diﬃcult experiences of many democratizing
countries, such as the Dominican Republic.
The ﬁndings and conclusions of this paper are those of the authors and do

















































































































dThe 1990s saw a dramatic increase in the number of countries selecting their
leaders through competitive elections, from 60 countries in 1989 to 100 by 2000.
The phenomenon swept through poorer countries, as well: among countries
with less than the median country’s per capita income, 15 percent elected their
governments in 1989 and 42 percent in 2000.1 The spread of democracy has
heightened the importance of a fundamental question: why do some democra-
cies perform better than others? Performance diﬀerences are certainly signiﬁ-
cant. For example, in 1995, 40 percent of the countries that had competitive
elections scored no better on a common measure of corruption than 50 percent
of the countries that did not have competitive elections. The literature sug-
gests many possible explanations for such variation, including diﬀerences in the
extent to which voters are informed about the actions of elected leaders; in voter
preferences, including their ideological leanings; and in the speciﬁc electoral and
political institutions that dictate how elected leaders attain oﬃce and how they
make decisions once in oﬃce. This paper turns to a new and unexamined di-
mension along which democracies seem systematically to diﬀer: the ability of
political competitors to make credible pre-electoral promises to voters.
Existing models of electoral competition assume either that electoral promises
are never credible to any voters or are always credible to all voters. The ar-
gument here allows non-credible politicians to expend resources to build their
credibility. They can do so by directly organizing groups of voters or by ap-
pealing to individuals - patrons - who themselves can make credible promises to
groups of voters, their clients. Under these conditions, non-credible politicians
have incentives to pursue policies that are regularly observed in democracies
with problematic records: high levels of rent-seeking, signiﬁcant transfers to
targeted groups of voters, and modest public good provision. This particular
and widely-observed combination of policy outcomes is not predicted by models
that assume either full or non-credibility.
Policy outcomes in poor-performing democracies are often identiﬁed with
the inﬂuence of clientelism and, speciﬁcally, of patrons. The analysis here sug-
gests that the inﬂuence of patrons is a symptom of the absence of credibility.
Given that politicians are not credible, patron inﬂuence on policy outcomes is
mixed rather than unambiguously negative. Politician reliance on patrons ac-
tually improves outcomes relative to the situation in which politicians can do
1Calculated from the number of countries with the maximum value of two variables, the
Legislative and Executive Indices of Electoral Competitiveness, from the Database of Political
Institutions (Beck, et al., 2001).
2nothing to make themselves credible. Compared to the case in which political
competitors have no access to patrons, but can increase credibility by directly
organizing voters, the presence of patrons reduces public good provision and has
ambiguous eﬀects on rent-seeking.
Reliance on patrons can also be an obstacle to political development. Our
argument therefore provides an explanation of why some democracies quickly
succeed while others exhibit stagnation in both their political and economic de-
velopment. The former are endowed with political competitors with well-known
policy stances who are immediately able to make credible promises when elec-
tions are introduced. Political competitors in the latter countries must develop
credibility over time. However, to the extent they rely on patrons, the speed
with which they increase their own credibility through the direct organization
of voters can slow. In countries in which individuals derive signiﬁcant social
and economic beneﬁts from their association with patrons, politicians may have
little incentive ever to build up credible political organizations of their own.
The policy distortions associated with low levels of credibility therefore persist
f o rl o n g e rp e r i o d s .
The paper concludes by demonstrating how the model of “partial credibility”
and clientelism developed here can explain a diverse set of puzzles in economic
and political development. Two of these are related to democratic development
and policy choice in young and mature democracies. For some countries, such
as Great Britain, the expansion of the franchise ushered in a period of signif-
icant policy reform and greater attention to public good provision; in others,
such as the Dominican Republic, this did not occur. The argument below traces
this strikingly diﬀerent evolution to the presence or absence of credible politi-
cal competitors on the eve of democratization. Similarly, the likelihood that
in younger democracies political competitors have less ability to rely on pol-
icy reputations and greater incentive to rely on patrons explains why younger
democracies systematically undertake greater public investment as a fraction of
GDP and exhibit higher levels of corruption than do countries with a longer
democratic tradition.
31 Why do democracies spend diﬀerently? Ex-
planations in the literature
The analysis in this paper, though concerned with the general theme of why
some democracies perform persistently better than others, focuses speciﬁcally
on government spending choices: under what conditions do governments under-
provide public goods beneﬁting all citizens in favor of goods and services exclu-
sively beneﬁting more targeted groups of citizens or rent-seeking that beneﬁts
political decision makers themselves? A large literature addresses this ques-
tion, focusing generally on information asymmetry and political and electoral
institutions.
With respect to information, Besley and Burgess (2003) and Strömberg
(2004) demonstrate that targeted public spending ﬂows to more informed in-
dividuals (those with greater exposure to newspapers or radio). The eﬀects
of information on the tradeoﬀ politicians make between broad public and more
narrowly targeted goods are not yet well-understood. However, Mani and
Mukand (2002) demonstrate that if elections are intended to enable voters to
select the most competent candidates, then resource allocation will be biased
towards those public goods that allow voters to better assess politician ability —
those for which outcomes are less subject to noisy, exogenous and unobservable
forces.
A large literature examines institutional sources of spending distortions.
Persson and Tabellini (2000) summarize and signiﬁcantly extend the litera-
ture looking at the eﬀects of political and electoral institutions on precisely the
choices governments make among public and private goods, and rent-seeking.
They demonstrate that the eﬀects of electoral institutions on political incentives
depend on whether politicians can make credible pre-electoral promises to vot-
ers. If politicians are entirely unable to make credible promises, rent-seeking is
less under proportional representation systems than under plurality voting; the
reverse is true if political competitors can make credible pre-electoral commit-
ments to voters. More importantly for the analysis here, they conclude that
when politicians are not credible, targeted transfers are lower (zero, actually)
and public good spending can be higher than when they are credible.2
2For example, if H(g) is the concave function describing the utility that voters derive from
public good spending g,a n dt h e r ea r eN groups of voters, then under plurality voting with
non-credible politicians, public good spending is deﬁned by the condition Hg(g)=4 /N < 1
for N>4 (Persson and Tabellini, p. 238). If, however, promises are credible, and there are
at least ﬁve groups of voters, two with median voters biased towards one party, two biased
4These results are at variance with the behavior of many democracies, par-
ticularly young or poor democracies, where the credibility of the promises of
political competitors can be reasonably doubted. In these countries, one fre-
quently observes instead anxiety among politicians about their ability to provide
patronage and other types of targeted good provision to voters and little concern
about public good provision, yielding both a low quality and low quantity of
public goods. In the analysis here, non-credible politicians have the option of
spending resources to make themselves credible, yielding outcomes that coincide
more closely with these observations.
Medina and Stokes (2002), Estévez, Magaloní and Díaz-Cayeros (2004),
Robinson and Verdier (2002), and Wantchekon (2003) all examine targeted
spending in the context of clientelism. These studies diﬀer from the analysis
here in their analysis of the origins of clientelism. Here, clientelism emerges
as a consequence of political eﬀorts to build credibility. In Medina and Stokes
(2002), on the other hand, pre-electoral promises are credible and clientelism
instead emerges when an incumbent-patron exercises monopoly control over as-
sets or economic opportunities valued by voters. Wantchekon (2003) argues,
in contrast, that variations in the credibility of clientelist versus public policy
promises can explain results from ﬁeld experiments in Benin that demonstrate
variation in the electoral utility of clientelist appeals across voters. The analysis
below oﬀers a framework for interpreting these experimental results.
Credibility issues are also at the heart of clientelism in Robinson and Verdier
(2002) and Robinson and Torvik (2002). They assume no pre-electoral promises
a r ec r e d i b l ea n da n a l y z et h ee ﬀects of political competition on taxes, certain
types of private goods, public goods, and rents, as here. In contrast to the argu-
ment here, however, credibility is exogenous: politicians can only inﬂuence the
credibility of their appeals through policy choice, and then only when they have
an exogenously determined relationship with one group of voters that their com-
p e t i t o rd o e sn o t—e i t h e rak n o w na ﬃnity for one group of voters (their welfare
enters into the incumbent’s utility) or the ability to observe the productivity of
one group of voters should they be hired into the public sector.
For example, in Robinson and Verdier (2002), incumbents and challengers
cannot credibly commit to diﬀerent tax and public investment policies. How-
ever, the incumbent, but not the challenger, can observe the productivity of
t o w a r d st h eo t h e ra n das w i n gg r o u pw i t ha nu n b i a s e dm e d i a nv o t e r ,p o l i t i c a lc o m p e t i t o r s
focus all their eﬀorts on the swing group; public good spending is then given by Hg(g)=1 ,
implying less public good spending than in the non-credible case (p. 214).
5one group of voters. As long as the incumbent can earn suﬃcient rents from
hiring workers and expanding public employment, he has no incentive to rescind
labor contracts in the second and ﬁnal period of the model. He can therefore
make credible oﬀers to this group of voters that cannot be matched by the chal-
lenger, providing him with a potential electoral advantage. These employment
contracts come at the expense of growth-promoting public goods.3
By not assuming special connections between political competitors and par-
ticular groups of voters, we can explore three phenomena more fully. The ﬁrst
is the intermediary role of patrons between political competitors and voters.
The analysis below asks how this role might inﬂuence policy outcomes. Sec-
ond, credible political parties develop in some countries and not in others. By
giving political competitors the option to invest in credibility, we can begin to
consider the conditions under which credible political parties can ever emerge.
Third, clientelist outcomes emerge even in societies in which there are no obvi-
ous diﬀerences between political competitors in their aﬃnity for or their ability
to observe the performance of particular groups of voters. The analysis here
directly addresses how this outcome might emerge.
Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2003) argue that the choices that politicians
make are driven by their eﬀorts to build a winning coalition out of the "selec-
torate", the set of people who can inﬂuence the choice of leaders. Depending
on the characteristics of the selectorate, policies that promote political survival
in some contexts undermine political tenure in others. The analysis here can be
seen as describing in detail how the need to make credible promises shapes the
selectorate.
Finally, in the US context, clientelism is often synonymous with machine
politics, in which parties redistribute to their ideological supporters. Dixit and
Londregan (1996) argue that machine politics emerge when groups have ideolog-
ical aﬃnities and parties are better able to make transfers to their own aﬃnity
group than to the other party’s or to ideologically neutral voters. They assume
that political promises to these voters are credible and abstract from public
goods and rents. The discussion in this paper is complementary, following
Dixit and Londregan in arguing that the organization of voters is costly, and in
3Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) argue similarly that some voters might derive utility from
re-electing an incumbent who shares some ethnic or other identiﬁcation with them. Unlike
the Robinson, et al. analyses, however, the incumbent’s credibility does not drive ineﬃciency.
Instead, incumbents use redistribution away from non-privileged voters to drive them out of
the political jurisdiction and reduce opposition. The utility that privileged voters get from
t h ef a c tt h a t“ o n eo ft h e i ro w n ”i si no ﬃce leads them to tolerate such policies even when
they reduce their own incomes.
6the assumption that groups of voters can be distinguished by the extent of their
ideological dispersion around an ideologically unbiased median group member.
2 The credibility of pre-electoral political promises
and clientelism
Two observations lie at the core of the analysis here. First, laying the ground-
work for credible agreement is costly. Resources are needed, for example, to
ensure that voters have the information that allows them to observe the fulﬁll-
ment of political promises; to monitor voter demands and preferences; and to
track electoral behavior. Second, politicians frequently rely on intermediaries
— or patrons — who can promise the votes of clients in return for policy conces-
sions. A wealth of case studies in the literature make clear that patrons and
clients are linked by their ability to make credible agreements with each other
regarding the exchange of personal favors and gifts.
2.1 Direct reputation-building
It is well-known that repeated interaction, suﬃciently low discount rates and
observable actions can allow for credible commitments between politicians inside
a legislature, or between buyers and sellers in economic markets. However,
credibility also requires numerous preconditions that are usually taken as given,
but may in fact not be in place unless participants have made costly investments.
These serve, ﬁrst, to communicate promises. Voters who do not hear a promise
or who do not realize that the promise is directed at them will not respond to
it. To make sure that promises are heard, candidates advertise and sponsor
rallies. These investments also ensure, second, that voters and politicians can
monitor the fulﬁllment of political promises. The ability of voters to know
whether politicians have complied with their promises is often disrupted by the
unobservability of political decisions and exogenous shocks. Again, political
competitors can mitigate these diﬃculties by expending resources to inform
voters about their actions.4
Many political promises are made to groups of voters. In this case, political
4The analysis below does not consider the strategic manipulation of information. To
the extent that information provision is a key cost of building credibility, the analysis below
assumes that the information is veriﬁable at zero cost to voters, removing incentives to inform
strategically.
7competitors need to spend resources to ameliorate collective action problems,
a third precondition for credible agreement. Whether the group receives the
beneﬁt or not depends very little on the voting behavior of any single member of
that group. If politicians subsidize the individual costs of voting, they mitigate
this problem. Voter registration drives or voter transportation on election day
have precisely this eﬀect.
Fourth, political competitors must convince voters to whom they make tar-
geted promises that the politicians have a system for tracking the promisees and
the fulﬁllment of promises. This is costly, requiring an administrative apparatus
separate from the state bureaucracy. Politicians will also want to be sure that
individual voters who receive the promises vote; for that, politicians again try to
provide transportation to the polls or undertake house-to-house canvassing on
election day. In a similar context, Wantchekon (2003) argues that pre-electoral
transfers can be seen as a way to establish the credibility of political promises.
This speciﬁc form of laying the groundwork for credible agreement is not ana-
lyzed in the model below, but provides a more general sense of the costliness of
credibility.
Eﬀorts of political competitors to build credibility directly with voters are, in
the analysis below, assumed to apply both to public and private goods. To the
extent that they emphasize private goods or targeted transfers, the necessary
investments in credibility begin to look like party machines, which provide an
organizational structure that allows politicians to make promises to speciﬁc
citizens, to track citizen voting behavior, and to demonstrate to citizens that
politicians have fulﬁlled promises. In all cases, though, we expect that the costs
of setting the preconditions for credible relations with voters should rise with
the fraction of the electorate that politicians seek to reach.
2.2 Reliance on patrons
Rather than establish a direct relationship with voters, however, politicians can
also exploit patron-client relations. This requires that patrons and clients, on
the one hand, and political competitors and patrons on the other, can make
credible agreements with each other. An ample literature suggests that both
conditions are frequently met. In particular, it is evident from many case
studies that repeated, non-simultaneous exchange is at the core of patron-client
relationships, suggesting that patrons and clients have solved the credibility
problem. From his research on Southeast Asia, Scott (1972, 92) characterizes
8patron-client relationships as ones “in which an individual of higher socioeco-
nomic status (patron) uses his own inﬂuence and resources to provide protection
or beneﬁts, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, recip-
rocates by oﬀering general support and assistance, including personal services,
to the patron.” Bista (1991, p. 90), describes the operation of clientelism in
Nepal (where it is called chakari) emphasizing as well the non-simultaneous
exchange of favors over time:
“Typically, chakari is performed in the morning and at the house
of the person whose favours are being cultivated, when there is some
assurance of actually seeing him. Some chakariwal go into the house
and remain therefore several hours, mostly in the courtyard, do their
greetings and then leave. ... [O]ther forms of chakari include oﬀer-
ing gifts, either material gifts or gifts in services and favours. For
the important, there will be a number of chakariwal in attendance
everyday. ... The gift donor in chakari has certain rights. There is
an obligation on the part of the recipient to respond to the chakari-
wal when the chakariwal so determines. It is possible at that point
to hedge the obligation but this is diﬃcult and must be done with
an explanation (example ‘I can’t oﬀer you this job because of other
pressing concerns but I can oﬀer you something else either now or
in the future.’) Ultimately, there has to be a balance in exchange
relations.” (p. 91-2).
Lemarchand (1972, p. 72) writes that among the many African countries he
surveys, “Inherent in each [clientelistic pattern] is a relationship of reciprocity
between an individual (or group of individuals) whose inﬂuence stems from his
ability to provide services, goods or values that are so desired by others as to
induce them to reciprocate these gratiﬁcations in the form of alternative ser-
vices, goods and values.” Powell (1970, p. 412) observes similar patterns in
southern Italy. “[T]he formation and maintenance of the [patron-client] rela-
tionship depends on reciprocity in the exchange of goods and services. ... [T]he
development and maintenance of a patron-client relationship rests heavily on
face-to-face contact between the two parties ...” In an Italian community in cen-
tral Italy, low status persons could begin to establish such a bond by presenting
a gift, making a request, or putting oneself at the disposal of the potential pa-
tron, to run errands, etc. (Powell, p. 413). Current favors in exchange for future
9consideration are here, as elsewhere, at the center of a developing patron-client
relationship.
Political competitors can often make credible agreements with patrons more
cheaply than they can make agreements directly with voters. Scott cites the
work of Nash on the 1960 elections in Burma: “When a local patron was ap-
proached to join U Nu’s faction of the AFPFL on the promise of later patronage,
he was able to get thirty-nine others — his relatives and those who owed him
money or for whom he had done favors, i.e., his clients — to join as well.” (Scott
1972, 110). The patron’s incentive to agree to this arrangement was driven not
only by the potentially high rents — Scott (1972, p. 110) reports that parties
often had to give a local patron signiﬁcant authority over local administrative
and development decisions in exchange for vote delivery — but the conﬁdence
that these rent promises were credible.
The arrangements documented by Scott in Burma are one possible way for
political competitors to get around the problem that their promises are not
credible to voters. Another is for them to choose candidates who are cred-
ible to smaller constituencies. Anirudh Krishna (2002) has found that these
personalized relationships are the key characteristic sought after in legislative
candidates in India:
“Babulal Bor, a [new leader] of Kundai village, Udaipur district,
recalled as follows: ‘I have been working for the villagers for about 10
years now. It is hard work. People come in the middle of the night,
and I cannot refuse. I take them to the hospital on my motorcycle.
I am available to them night and day. I have no time for my family.
... But it has become my life now. If a day goes by when no one
comes to my door, I cannot sit peacefully. ... I will never be rich
... but someday I might be MLA [Member of the State Legislative
Assembly]. I came close to getting a ticket [party nomination] the
last time [elections were held].”
The analysis below assumes that patron-client relationships are forged inde-
pendently of political considerations. Krishna’s story of Babulal Bor supports
this assumption, making clear that the payoﬀs to the “patron” of making trans-
fers to clients had more to do with social standing in his village than with the
desire to hold oﬃce. Looking at Colombian politics, Archer (1990) quotes one
politician who viewed his role prior to entering politics as one of “a man of
respect” (un hombre de respeto). His many and repeated exchanges with his
10peasant “clients” were valuable ﬁrst and foremost because of the added prestige
they gave him in the community. In other contexts, the traditional payoﬀ to
patrons of having large numbers of clients has been physical protection. In ex-
change for their services as foot soldiers in defense of the patron, clients could
count on the patron for various kinds of support. Antlöv (1994) notes the im-
portance of this for political organization in Java, noting that in parts of Java
where the Islamic Darul Islam rebels were active, from 1949-1962, “[w]hole pop-
ulations were mobilized to protect the village from the rebels” and that these
mobilizations formed the basis of clientelist relations (p. 76).5 Once again, the
patron-client relationship was formed independently of the dynamics of political
competition.
A key conclusion of the analysis below is that the need to build credibil-
ity drives political competition towards the provision of private goods. The
qualitative evidence supports this prediction and ties it to credibility. Scott
(1972) quotes Wurfel, for example, as pointing out that “The Filipino politician
... does favors individually rather than collectively because he wishes to create
a personal obligation of clientship” (p. 109). The importance of transfers to
individuals is key to Pakistani politicians as well. Wilder (1999) quotes former
members of the Pakistani National Assembly from the state of Punjab as saying
“People now think that the job of an MNA and MPA is to ﬁx their gutters, get
their children enrolled in school, arrange for job transfers. ... [These tasks]
consume your whole day ...” (p. 196); “Look, we get elected because we are ba
asr log [eﬀective people] in our area. People vote for me because they perceive
me as someone who can help them. ... Sombody’s son is a matric fail and I get
him a job as a teacher or a government servant. ... If somebody’s son is ﬁrst
class, he’s not coming to me to get him a job. If somebody has merit they very
rarely come to me. ... But it’s the real wrongdoers who come to me” (p. 204).
Observers of African politics note a similar dynamic. Lewis (1998, p. 144)
writes, “Independent African regimes have typically relied upon patrimonial
forms of state consolidation and governance”, where patrimonialism is under-
stood as the personalized exchange of resources for support. His analysis echoes
5These intangible rewards are related to the assumptions about voter and candidate pref-
erences in Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) or Robinson and Torvik (2002), where candidates and
voters belong to particular groups and are assumed to derive utility from increasing each
other’s welfare. Most of the case study literature on clientelism emphasizes the pragmatic na-
ture of the relationship rather than the emotional. Without detracting from the importance
of preference eﬀects on clientelism, this analysis highlights the importance for clientelism of
reciprocity and reputation.
11that of Jackson and Rosberg (1982). Archer (1990) also notes that his polit-
ical informant entered politics precisely because it allowed him to address the
increasingly complex problems confronted by his “clients.”
One might argue in addition that politicians in clientelist countries are, de-
spite the interesting social dynamics documented by observers, little diﬀerent
from legislators in all countries who are consumed by “casework”, “homestyle”
or “pork”. Mayhew (1974) and Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987) argue that dif-
ﬁculties in claiming credit for broad public policy innovations that beneﬁtt h e i r
constituents lead American legislators to devote signiﬁcant resources to person-
alized constituency service and local infrastructure (pork barrel) projects. The
point here is simply that the degree of concern for “casework” is much higher
in clientelist countries. In non-clientelist countries, national candidates and na-
tional parties are able to make credible promises regarding public good provision
or national economic and social policies. If they focus only on pork, they hurt
their competitive position regarding these broader policy issues. Purely clien-
telist politicians do not confront this tradeoﬀ since they can make no promises
regarding broad public good provision.
The contrast in the ways in which legislators from non-clientelist and clien-
telist countries spend their time provides some indication of the relatively re-
duced emphasis on constituency service in non-clientelist countries. Members
of the United States Congress have been found to spend on average fewer than
six hours per week directly and personally intervening on behalf of constituents
in order to obtain favors for them or help them solve bureaucratic diﬃculties
(Johannes, 1983). This is in sharp contrast to Pakistani legislators, who also
competed in majoritarian electoral systems but who devoted almost all of their
time to the direct satisfaction of individual constituent interests. It could be
argued that US congressmen have large staﬀs to take care of these problems.
However, in a clientelist state, using staﬀ to deal with constituent issues creates
ambiguities about the reciprocal obligations of the client to the patron and is
an invitation to create a political competitor, since the person doing the favor
gets disproportionate credit.
123 Political competition in the absence of credi-
bility
To see the eﬀects of credibility on policy, two versions of a political game are
developed here. In the ﬁrst, political competitors have no access to patrons
and can only make credible promises to those voters whom they spend resources
to "organize", shorthand for the resources they spend to communicate promises
to these voters, to track promises and their fullﬁllment, to monitor their voting
behavior, etc. In the second game, competitors can also appeal to patrons for
support. Political competition is over two periods, assuming that promises are
credible once the up-front costs of setting the preconditions for political com-
petition are made. We demonstrate in the appendix that the policy outcomes
that emerge from this two-period game can be supported by subgame perfect
equilibria of an inﬁnitely repeated game in which credibility is not assumed.
Let society be composed of a continuum of groups of measure N,e a c ho f
size one and with each citizen in every group having equal income normalized
to unity. We index each group by the variable m ∈ [0,N].T h e r e a r e t w o
parties, A and B. Voters in each group have an ideological bias σm
i , positive
values of which indicate a bias in favor of party B and negative values a bias







. The median voter in each group is assumed to be
unbiased.6 Without loss of generality, groups are ordered such that the density
of the ideological distribution of groups φ(m) is a non-increasing continuous
function of the group index m (e.g., φ(1) ≥ φ(2)).
Preferences over government policy for every member of group m are deﬁned
by the quasi-linear utility function Wm
i =1− τ + I [f(m)] + H(g),w h e r eτ is
the tax rate, f(m) is the per capita transfer made by the government to every
member of group m, I is the utility of those transfers, and public good provision
is given by g with utility H(g) to all members of all groups. H (g) is assumed
non-decreasing, concave and diﬀerentiable. I [f (m)] is assumed to have the
same properties because, even if transfers f consist entirely of cash, there are
likely to be deadweight losses associated with the transfers. Moreover, if f takes
t h ef o r mo fi n - k i n db e n e ﬁts for which utility might be expected to diminish (food
6The model retains its symmetry and all results even if we allow the median ideological
bias of the groups to deviate from zero, as long as the average bias across all groups is zero.
T h a ti s ,i fag r o u p ’ sb i a si sg i v e nb yσ(m), the results of the analysis remain the same as long
as
U N
m=0 σ (m)φ(m)dm =0 .
13handouts, for example). Therefore, it is assumed that I3 ≤ 1,a n dI3 =1if and
only if f =0 : an additional unit of transfers can never be more highly valued
than one (an additional dollar of transfers can never be worth more than one
dollar to voters).Finally, governments attempt to extract rents, r. The notation
and assumptions are similar to Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 8), with
three exceptions: I3 [f (m)] ≤ 1, N is continuous, and every group’s ideological
distribution is unbiased and is characterized by a non-increasing continuous
function of the group index m.7
3.1 Costless credibility
Three benchmarks are useful to assess the impact of variations in credibility on
government policy. The ﬁrst is the optimal policy, assuming that social welfare
is utilitarian. To ﬁnd this, maximize
U N
m=0 {(1 − τ)+I [f (m)] + H (g)}dm
with respect to the policy instruments τ, f(m), g,a n dr, subject to the budget
constraint Nτ =
U N
m=0 f (m)dm + g + r. It follows immediately that rents are
zero. In addition, as long as I3 [f (m)] < 1 then f (m)=0for all m (transfers
oﬀer less utility than the taxes needed to ﬁnance them), public good provision
is given by H3 (g)= 1
N, the Samuelsonian condition for public good provision,




The second benchmark assumes that politicians are non-credible and voters
c a nc o o r d i n a t eo na ne xp o s tv o t i n gr u l ew i t hw h i c ht oj u d g ei n c u m b e n tp e r -
formance, as in Ferejohn (1986) and developed by Persson and Tabellini (2000,
Chapter 9). In this case, inter-voter competition drives transfers down to zero
and, because incumbents need only attract the support of just over half the
electorate to win, they set public good spending at a lower rate, to H3 (g)= 2
N,
set the tax rate to unity (taxes equal income), and set rents equal to r = Nτ−g.
The third benchmark is the policy outcome when both political parties can
make credible commitments to voters. Two assumptions are standard when an-
alyzing credible political competitors. First, political parties seek to maximize
rents R + γr,w h e r eR is the non-pecuniary rents from holding oﬃce, r is the
pecuniary rents, and γ ≤ 1 is the rate at which politicians can convert rents into
transfers to themselves (the rate would drop below one as, for example, the fees
to set up oﬀshore bank accounts rise). Second,a l t h o u g hb o t hp a r t i e sk n o wt h e
7Recall from the previous footnote, however, that the results we derive below are robust
to relaxing the assumption of unbiasedness.
14ideological distribution of the electorate, they are uncertain about the location
of this distribution ahead of any given election: just before elections, and after
parties announce their (credible) platforms, an ideological shock occurs. As-







game, then, is as follows: parties announce their policy commitments regarding
rents, public goods, transfers and taxes; an ideological shock δ occurs; elections
take place; and the winning party implements its announced platform.
Voter i in group m prefers party A if A’s promises qA =( τA,g A,f A (m),r)
oﬀer her greater welfare than B’s promises, taking into account voter ideology:
Wm(qA)=1−τA +I [fA (m)] + H (gA) >Wm(qB)+σm
i +δ.P a r t y A’s vote
share following the ideological shock, denoted by πA, is the fraction of voters
for whom A’s platform provides greater welfare than B’s platform, net of the






















φ(m)[Wm(qA) − Wm(qB) − δ]dm
where σm is the ideological bias of the swing voter in group m, given the plat-
forms of the two parties and the ideological shock, or
σm = Wm(qA) − Wm(qB) − δ. That is, party A’s vote share is the fraction
of voters between σm and the lower end of the ideological distribution, − 1
2φ(m)
(the group of voters most favorable to A). Using the distribution of the ideo-
logical shock, the probability that the vote share will exceed one-half and that





























f (m)dm + g + r.
>From the ﬁrst order conditions for this problem, assuming interior solutions,
and recognizing that the problems of the two parties are entirely symmetrical,










φ(m)dm for f (m) > 0
τ =
U N








Public good provision is the same as in the socially optimal benchmark, but
rents, transfers and taxes are all potentially higher.
Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst order conditions for transfers and the tax rate tell us







The right hand side of equation (3) is the average ideological dispersion in the
society. This condition states that transfers go only to those groups with
below average ideological dispersion. That is, the higher is m, recalling that
ideological density φ(m) is decreasing in m, the less likely are transfers to group
m.
Moreover, from (2), transfers are falling in m:i f φ(m) > φ(m3),t h e n
f(m) >f (m3). This conclusion is intuitive and familiar from similar models
in the literature (e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2000, Chapter 8). Transfers to
groups of voters are more valuable to the extent that they move the median
16further a larger fraction of voters in a group above σm, the ideological position
of group m’s swing voter. The greater the bunching of voters around σm,t h e
larger is the fraction of voters whose allegiances can be shifted from party B to
party A by a given transfer.
Rent-seeking also increases with N, the number of voting groups to which
politicians appeal (the size of the electorate), equivalent in the current con-
text to the size of the population. This is clear from the last equation in
(2), demonstrating that rents increase when electoral uncertainty increases (ψ
declines), but that this eﬀect is magniﬁed by the number of groups N.I d e o -
logical shocks aﬀect all citizens equally, regardless of the number of groups (size
of the electorate). Public good spending, however, has an increasing electoral
payoﬀ the larger is N, as the equilibrium condition H3 (g)= 1
N indicates. The
increasing eﬀectiveness of public good spending for larger populations gives po-
litical competitors greater scope for retaining rents while at the same time using
policy to oﬀset the eﬀects of political shocks.
3.2 Costly credibility
What happens, however, if politicians can only make credible promises to those
voters whom they have previously expended resources to organize? Assume
that politicians expend resources to organize and make credible promises to a
fraction n of all voters and that the costs of organization are given by C (n),
C3 (n) > 0 and C33 (n) > 0. Diminishing returns to voter organization are
supported by the literature reviewed earlier. Political parties devote enormous
resources to voter-by-voter mobilization strategies, precisely where diminishing
returns to organizational expenditures are most likely. In addition to setting its
policy platform, each party must also optimally set the voters to whom it seeks



















f (m)dm + g + C (n)+r.
17The maximization problem (4) assumes that if politicians organize any groups of
voters, they ﬁrst organize those groups for which m is lowest. This follows from
equation (3) of the earlier model of costless credibility, that politicians prefer
to target groups that have the highest density of ideologically uncommitted
voters.
The tradeoﬀ between targeted spending and public good spending is given
by equating the two respective ﬁrst order conditions,




However, for an interior solution, public good spending must also meet the
condition given by the equation of the ﬁrst order conditions for public good
spending and taxes, H3(g)= 1
N, the same as in the full-credibility case. That
is, for an interior solution, n is large enough such that the payoﬀs to targeted
transfers never exceed 1
N.
All other policy outcomes do change, however. Rents are greater, larger
transfers go to those groups that receive transfers, and total transfers are (prob-
ably) larger. Denote the solutions from the full credibility case with the sub-
script 1 and those from the case where politicians must organize voters with











(R + γr)+λN =0
and that the ﬁrst order condition on rents (in equilibrium, when each of the
parties has a ﬁfty percent chance of winning) is 1
2γ − λ =0 . Substituting, we


















The conclusion that f2 (m) >f 1 (m) — those groups that receive transfers
receive larger transfers when credibility is costly — follows from (5) and the ﬁrst
order condition for transfers, f(m).T h e ﬁrst order condition is the same in




{I3 [f (m)]φ(m)}(R + γr) − λ =0 .
18Since r2 >r 1 it must also be true that f2 (m) >f 1 (m).
Whether total transfers are also higher depends on the fraction of groups
that receive transfers in the two problems. If more groups receive transfers
in the second problem, then total transfers are unambiguously greater when
credibility is costly. If fewer groups receive transfers, it is possible that total
transfers are greater when credibility is costly, but not certain. To identify the







This means that m1 is the last group that receives transfers in problem 1 (cost-
less credibility). Correspondingly, let m2 be the last group to receive transfers







Groups [0,m 1) all receive positive transfers in problem 1. However, groups
[0,m 2) receive positive transfers in problem 2 only if they are all organized —
only if m2 ≤ n2.O t h e r w i s e [0,n 2] receive positive transfers (unorganized voters
never receive transfers). Because N>n 2, and because φ(m) is falling in m,
it must be the case that m2 >m 1.T h e r e f o r e , i f n2 ≥ m1, aggregate transfers
are unambiguously higher in problem 2: per-capita (and per-group) transfers
are higher in problem 2, and more groups receive these transfers. If, however,
n2 <m 1, the comparison is ambiguous. Still, because transfers per group are
higher in problem 2, it must also be the case that even for some range of values
of n2 <m 1, total transfers are greater when credibility is costly.
It is well-known that when politicians have incentives to focus on only a
segment of the electorate, transfers are likely to rise relative to public good
spending: the smaller the set of target voters, the less electorally valuable
are public goods relative to transfers. In some analyses (e.g., Lizzeri and
Persico 2001), this focus is driven by electoral rules. Here, politicians themselves
determine which and how many voters will be the focus of attention, their eﬀorts
driven not by electoral rules but by their incentive to expand the fraction of
voters who believe their pre-electoral promises.
In sum, when politicians are non-credible but able to invest resources to
improve their credibility, signiﬁcant deviations emerge compared to the bench-
19mark cases. Relative to the case of costless, full credibility, public spending is
the same, but rents are higher and transfers are likely higher. Compared to the
benchmark case of non-credibility with ex post voting rules, public good spend-
ing is higher, transfers are large, and rent-seeking is more restrained. These
are the outcomes we most closely associate with those democracies in which
political competitors appear to be least credible.
3.3 Costly credibility with patrons
In many situations, politicians do not have to organize voters directly; they can
r e l yo ni n t e r m e d i a r i e s—o np a t r o n s—t oo rganize voters for them. The literature
reviewed earlier points to three key characteristics of patrons. First, they can
make credible agreements with politicians, even when clients cannot. Second,
they are able to make, at no cost, credible commitments to some groups of vot-
ers because of their long-time personal interaction with those voters. Third,
patrons can extract a fraction of the transfers that ﬂow from the state to their
clients but they can extract none of the public goods. This is an important as-
sumption and emerges directly from the literature on patron-client relationships.
On the one hand, patron relationships with clients are based on personalized
exchanges, so patrons ﬁnd it diﬃcult to take credit for public good provision
that beneﬁts all voters and not just their clients. On the other, patrons ﬁnd
it diﬃcult to control client access to public goods. Patrons can intermediate
with government oﬃcials when clients are looking for a patronage position in
government, but clearly cannot inﬂuence the beneﬁts that clients extract from
a strong national defense.
Let π b et h ef r a c t i o no fg r o u p sc o n t r o l l e db yp a t r o n sa n dl e tρ be the fraction
of each group of voters whose patrons make a deal with political competitors,
0 ≤ ρ ≤ π ≤ 1. Direct transfers from politicians to voters in group m are,
as before, given by f (m). Politicians can also make transfers k(m) through
p a t r o n st oc l i e n t si ng r o u pm. Patrons extract compensation, a tax θ,f r o m
transfers k(m), so clients receive utility I [(1 − θ)k(m)] from indirect transfers
routed through patrons. The tax θ captures in reduced form the relationship
between patrons and clients. For clients trapped in a feudal relationship with
their patron, θ is large; where patrons compete vigorously for clients, it is small.
Party A goes through the same decision making process as before, this time
also optimally choosing how many voters it will organize through patrons and

























[(1 − ρ)f (m)+ρk(m)]dm + g + C [(1 − ρ)n]+r
0 ≤ ρ ≤ π
As the budget constraint in (6) makes clear, to the extent that political
competitors choose to use patrons to organize voters, raising ρ, they can expend
fewer resources organizing voters directly. They are not necessarily a boon for
politicians, however. Patrons impose a potentially high tax on their clients that
reduces the usefulness of political promises. Moreover, they are not receptive
to political promises of public goods that beneﬁt a large number of voters, client
and non-client, at potentially lower cost than transfers.
The availability of patrons unambiguously reduces public good provision
relative to the case where patrons are not an option. Where subscripts denote
the solution from problem 3 (costly credibility with patrons), the ﬁrst order





(1 − ρ)H3 (g3)
] n3
m=0
φ(m)dm − λ =0
















+ λN =0 .
Combining these two equations, the condition for equilibrium public goods pro-















= H3 (g2)=H3 (g1).
To the extent that politicians take advantage of patron services, therefore, (7)
indicates that public good provision is lower than if they had no recourse to
politicians and had to organize voters themselves. This is not surprising: be-
cause of their single-minded focus on transfers rather than public goods, re-
liance on patrons should drive down public good provision. At the same time,
reliance on patrons may yield a higher level of public goods than in the no-
credibility case with an ex post voting rule, where public good provision is given
by H3 (g)= 2
N.
The presence of patrons yields unambiguously higher rents than in the full-
credibility case, problem 1, and potentially lower rents than in the non-credible
case with ex post voting rules. However, in relation to problem 2, costly cred-
ibility with no recourse to patrons, the eﬀects of patrons on rents, the fraction
of voters that politicians directly organize, and on total transfers is ambiguous.
This is not surprising. On the one hand, competition for the support of pa-
trons may lead politicians to appeal to voters whom they otherwise might have
ignored; such appeals might increase both the electoral penalty associated with
high rents and the electoral beneﬁts associated with transfers. On the other
hand, appeals to patrons might simply displace direct appeals to voters and
reduce total transfers.
One can still deduce unambiguous associations among these policy outcomes,
however. First, if we observe higher rents in the presence of patrons, then we
should also observe lower levels of direct organization of voters by politicians:
the need to appeal to a smaller fraction of voters directly increases the ability
of politicians to extract rents. This can be seen by noting that the ﬁrst order









































From equation (8) it follows immediately that if rents are higher in the presence
of patrons, n3 must be lower than n2. T h i si sas u ﬃcient condition for n3 <n 2;
it is clear that even when rents are lower in the presence of patrons, it may still
be the case that n3 <n 2.
If we observe higher rents in the presence of patrons, we should also observe
higher per-group transfers. To see this, equate the ﬁrst order conditions for
f (m) from problems 2 and 3, yielding
{I3 [f2 (m)]φ(m)}(R + γr2) − λ = (9)
{(1 − ρ)I3 [f3 (m)]φ(m)}(R + γr3) − λ(1 − ρ).
If r3 >r 2, (9) makes clear that I3 [f2 (m)] >I 3 [f3 (m)],s ot h a tf3 (m) >f 2 (m).
The logic here is straightforward: because politicians organize only a fraction
of any group, using patrons to appeal to the remaining voters, the eﬀect of
transfers directly by politicians has a smaller impact on the electoral behavior
of the whole group. To compensate for this, politicians make larger transfers to
those groups. Total transfers are likely to be larger under patronage, since in
addition to transfers f, politicians make indirect transfers k through patrons.
It is not possible to assert this unambiguously, however.
Several notable conclusions emerge from the discussion of patrons and costly
credibility. First, when non-credible politicians can build their credibility, even
if this is costly or if they must rely on patrons, voter welfare can be higher
than where non-credible politicians are constrained only by ex post voting rules.
Second, the most notable development pathologies typically associated with
clientelism — high rents and excessive emphasis on beneﬁts for narrow groups of
voters — emerge even in the absence of patrons, as a consequence of politician
eﬀorts to build credibility. The prevalence of patron-client relationships in a
society does not seem to cause the policy ills often associated with clientelism.
Instead, the absence of political credibility pushes these relationships into the
23political arena while at the same time distorting policy outcomes. Third,
though, although it is possible that patrons are the most socially beneﬁcial
tool for addressing problems of political credibility, this is likely not the case.
Reliance on patrons clearly suppresses public good provision. In addition,
reliance on patrons can and likely does lead to higher rents, higher transfers,
and fewer voters organized directly by politicians.
The absence of voter organization is especially important because it suggests
the possibility of a political development trap. Politicians have no incentive to
appeal to voters directly, voters therefore never believe politicians, patrons are
entrenched as inﬂuence brokers, and public policy remains focused on transfers
rather than public goods. This outcome is consistent with the view of clien-
telism that emerges in the literature and characterizes many accounts of "failed
states". Such an outcome oﬀers clear suggestions that reliance on patrons can
place a brake on both economic and political development. To the extent that
patrons discourage public policy oriented towards public good provision and
low rents/low taxes, economic development is obstructed. To the extent that
patrons lead political competitors to ignore the direct organization of voters,
the institutionalization of democratic competition is hindered. Some of these
implications are examined below.
4 Credibility, clientelism and some development
puzzles
If the foregoing analysis is correct, we would expect democracies in which po-
litical parties have not been able to consolidate policy reputations with voters,
such as young democracies, to adopt quite distinct public policies, exhibiting
lower public good provision, greater emphasis on providing beneﬁts to targeted
groups of voters, and signiﬁcant rent-seeking. This contrasts with predictions in
the literature (e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2000, chapters 8, 9), that non-credible
political competition should yield lower public good provision, no transfers, and
high rent-seeking. By the same token, the analysis also provides an explana-
tion for why some countries that have newly introduced competitive elections or
have dramatically increased the fraction of citizens with voting rights perform
better than others. In some, political competitors have pre-existing policy rep-
utations on which voters can rely; in others (most), they do not. Each of these
implications is examined below.
24Extensions of the analytical framework developed here are also likely to
oﬀer explanations for two additional phenomena. The ﬁrst is the development
of secure property rights. The analysis here focuses on budget decisions of
governments rather than decisions regarding the enforcement of property rights.
However, to the extent that property rights are a public good, the incentives
that low-credibility political actors have to emphasize targeted beneﬁts provide a
potentially new rationale for the uneven development of property rights security
among democracies. Second, a signiﬁcant phenomenon in many countries is that
successor governments abandon the half-completed infrastructure projects of
their predecessors. Robinson and Torvik (2002) show that this can occur when
the projects are value-subtracting. The analysis here suggests an explanation
for the abandonment of infrastructure projects that are value-adding.
4.1 Clientelism and the poor policy performance of young
democracies
It is diﬃcult to measure the credibility of political competitors. It is likely,
though, that the absence of credibility should be most pronounced among young
democracies, where politicians and voters have had limited opportunity to build
up reputations. Young democracies are increasingly prevalent: in 1985 there
were approximately 25 countries that had held competitive elections for fewer
than 20 years. By 2000, the number had jumped to more than 50. If young
democracies are in fact less credible then they should exhibit lower public good
provision (particularly if patrons are active); greater rent-seeking or corruption;
and more attention to targeted transfers beneﬁting only segments of the popu-
lation. There is considerable evidence in support the last two predictions, on
rent-seeking and targeted transfers.
It is certainly not the case that political competitors in older democracies
are always more credible in their broad policy promises than their counterparts
in younger democracies. Nevertheless, cross-country comparisons of democra-
cies reveal that those fewer than sixteen years old in 1997 (the median age of
democracies in 1997, deﬁned by the length of time that they had had both
competitive legislative and executive elections) were signiﬁcantly more corrupt
than older democracies and exhibited almost the same level of corruption as
non-democracies of all ages (Keefer 2004). With respect to targeted transfers,
Keefer (2004) ﬁnds that young democracies directed their ﬁscal policies more
resolutely towards public investment. Despite its label, public investment is a
25type of public spending that both casual and systematic analysis has identiﬁed
with rent-seeking and the satisfaction of narrow interests (e.g., Ferejohn 1974,
Davoodi and Tanzi 1997, and Keefer and Knack 2002). Of the 49 democracies
for which information is available on both regime age and public investment
spending, younger democracies spent 1.2 percentage points of national income
on public investment more than older democracies — nearly one standard devi-
ation more.
Qualitative or country studies support the notion that younger democracies
focus on targeted beneﬁts. Studies of countries experiencing the transition
from authoritarian to democratic government repeatedly note the reliance of
new political competitors on clientelist impulses. The democratic regime that
succeeded the authoritarian government of Getulio Vargas in post-World War
II Brazil was itself replaced in 1964 by the military. One of the military’s
purported aims was to create the conditions for the introduction of a “clean
democracy,” one in which the citizenry were free of clientelist ties to political
bosses and where rural voters were not controlled by country bosses (Duncan
Baretta and Markoﬀ, 1987, p. 53). Conaghan (1987) characterizes the par-
ties of the young Ecuadoran democracy as fundamentally clientelist (p. 157),
and Rosenberg describes political decision making in young Central American
democracies as personalized and based on vertical patronage networks (p. 197).
Former President of Perú, Alberto Fujimori — a man who entered oﬃce a vir-
tual unknown and without the assistance of an established political party —
assiduously cultivated voters who had scant knowledge of him by personally
inaugurating small public works projects in their villages, through the Foncodes
project, but did little to introduce systemwide improvements in the education
system. Wantchekon (2003), in his study of another young democracy, Benin,
documents the overwhelming appeal of clientelist political promises.
Sayari (in Gellner and Waterbury, 1977) writes that in the early years of
Turkish democracy in the 1940s, “party strategies for peasant mobilization were
based largely on the recruitment of notables into party ranks who were then en-
trusted with the task of providing ‘ready vote banks.’....This strategy met a
favourable response from the notables since assuming the leadership post of a
party’s local unit meant that a notable could (a) gain additional status and
prestige vis-à-vis rival notables, (b) secure new sources of outside support for
members of his faction, and (c) maintain and improve his economic standing
through party ties.” (Gellner and Waterbury, 1977, p. 107). These notables
were at the heads of extended clientelist networks. Such networks can develop
26into party machines: Sayari observes that “... as case studies on local-level pol-
itics show, the political inﬂuence of the notables at present depends more on
their roles as party functionaries than on their control of traditional patronage
resources ... [which] are likely to become politically relevant only when sup-
plemented with additional resources that have to do with party patronage ...”
(Gellner and Waterbury, p. 108). However, he notes the importance to parties of
providing individualized assistance: ﬁrst, in navigating the bureaucracy (which
are “relayed to local party leaders or deputies”) and, second, in the provision of
public investment for rural development projects (Gellner and Waterbury, 108).
Credibility is not the only dimension along which young democracies diﬀer
from older democracies, but it is likely to be the diﬀerence that best explains why
young democracies exhibit higher rents, more targeted spending and fewer public
goods. For example, voters are likely to be less well-informed and politicians are
likely to be less practiced or "competent", both of which are additional sources
of policy distortion. However, in the face of uninformed voters, the literature
has shown that politicians seem to reduce targeted transfers rather than increase
them. Similarly, we would expect incompetent politicians to be more ineﬃcient
in turning tax revenues into public and targeted goods, providing less of both
for any level of tax receipts, unlike the pattern we observe when contrasting
younger and older democracies.
4.2 Initial conditions and democratic development: Vic-
torian England and the Dominican Republic
The evolution of democracies is far from smooth and predictable. The analy-
sis here suggests that the eﬀect of enfranchisement or democratization on the
incentives of political leaders should depend on the credibility and ideological
attraction of political competitors; the extent to which voters have patrons;
and the eﬃciency with which public good spending can be translated into in-
creased welfare. One particular prediction is examined in this section. In
new democracies or in countries where voting rights are dramatically expanded
from a low level, we should observe persistent political preferences for targeted
transfers and against public goods where politicians must rely more on clien-
telist promises and less on issue-based reputations they might have developed
in the period prior to reform. A qualitati v ec o m p a r i s o no fd e m o c r a t i cr e f o r m s
in Victorian England to those of the Dominican Republic following the Trujillo
dictatorship supports this prediction.
27In the early 19th century, corruption, inﬂuence peddling, and patronage per-
meated electoral competition in England. This was due to the tiny size of the
electorate, which made vote-buying a cost-eﬀective electoral strategy. Begin-
ning in 1832, reforms began that would dramatically expand the franchise in
England. By the 1870s and 1880s, and following expansion of the franchise,
civil service reforms had curtailed government employment as a source of pa-
tronage; partisan rather than candidate-speciﬁc considerations dominated voter
decision making; and most parliamentary seats were contested. After a roughly
similar time period following the assassination of the dictator Rafael Trujillo in
1961 and the introduction of competitive elections and full enfranchisement, the
Dominican Republic has yet to see similar changes.
The ﬁrst Reform Act of 1832 increased the electorate from around 440,000 to
around 660,000 (O’Gorman 2001, p. 67), around ﬁve percent of the population.
Just as importantly, it eliminated the 86 smallest boroughs (constituencies)
and created new, more urban constituencies. Larger cities such as Manchester,
previously unrepresented, were allocated seats. Small boroughs, with a tiny
number of voters, were far more vulnerable to vote-buying. The Reform Act
of 1867 later doubled the size of the electorate. Substantial evidence indicates
that broad policy appeals, as opposed to clientelist promises to voters, were
increasingly important to political competition during this period.
First, in the decades following the reforms, candidates increasingly referred
to their party aﬃliations when campaigning (Cox, 1987, p. 130). In addition,
the tendency of voters to cast split votes for candidates from diﬀerent parties
also declined markedly over the period, consistent with the contention that par-
tisan more than clientelist promises were the currency of political competition
(Cox, p. 103). Consistent with this, voting inside Parliament also demonstrated
increasing cohesion, increasing signiﬁcantly from the 1850s to 1871 (Cox, Chap-
ter 3). Because local candidates no longer had to assemble clientelist blocs as
a condition of winning parliamentary elections, the increasing focus on partisan
rather than individual appeals reduced the costs of contesting elections for in-
dividual candidates and lowered barriers to entry. As a consequence, though
nearly half of the parliamentary seats from 1832 to 1865 were uncontested, from
1865 to 1885, this dropped to one quarter (Cox p. 69).
Finally, as policy increasingly drove electoral outcomes, signiﬁcant barriers
to patronage were imposed and eﬀorts to limit clientelist appeals (and, therefore,
to strengthen partisan appeals) were undertaken. These included the Ballot Act
in 1872, introducing the secret ballot; the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of
281883 that imposed electoral spending limits and curbed vote buying; and the
third Reform Act of 1885, which increased the electorate by three-quarters, to
nearly four million.
Cox (1987) argues that the succesful evolution of English democracy emerged
in part due to a struggle between the Cabinet and the Parliament and in part be-
cause of the simple fact that vote buying is more expensive when electorates are
large than when they are small. He notes that, beginning early in the century
and accelerating in the 1830s, the Cabinet proposed and Parliament approved
successive procedural changes that reduced the ability of MPs to propose legis-
lation on their own initiative (private legislation) and expanded the time spent
in Parliament on addressing Cabinet proposals. These changes raised the costs
to MPs of fulﬁlling clientelist promises to key constituents. However, many
young democracies, under similar conditions, have failed to make the transition
away from clientelist politics or have made the transition more slowly. One way
to highlight the puzzle is to note that the procedural changes pushed through
the English Parliament could as easily have led to a further shift in control
of patronage to the Cabinet, as in contemporary Bangladesh or Pakistan, two
young (or occasional) democracies with Westminster political systems. Instead,
the English Cabinet showed a marked preference for policy-based legislation.
The analysis here provides one way to explain the British success. On the
eve of electoral reform, parties and party leaders in England were already more
credible with respect to policy promises than the leaders of parties in many
new democracies, and the payoﬀs to clientelism were already lower. Indeed,
this explains why, even before the expansion of the franchise, the Cabinet was
eager to increase parliamentary attention to broad policy issues and away from
private legislation. Already in 1835, the year of the ﬁrst election following the
Reform Act of 1832, not only was legislative attention focused on the reform
of municipal corporations and the English and Irish established churches, but
these issues sharply divided Liberals and Conservatives. In the 1840s, debate
over the Corn Laws (free trade) had a similar divisive eﬀect (Cox 124).
Policy loomed suﬃciently large in political calculations that the Conservative
Party actually split over the repeal of the Corn Laws (Cox, Chapter 3); there
would be less reason for parties to split over policy diﬀerences if these were
electorally irrelevant. As early as the eighteenth century, the “Foxite” Whigs
broke oﬀ to form the Society of Friends of the People and in 1797 introduced
an electoral reform proposal in the Parliament (Ellis 1979, D-1262-64). One
of the leaders of this group, Charles Grey, would be the same Prime Minister
29who pushed through the Reform Act of 1832. Even the issue of expanding the
franchise itself divided political competitors in well-known ways.
Electoral behavior oﬀers additional, quantitative evidence that party labels
provided credible evidence to voters of issue stances even prior to the ﬁrst Re-
form Act. Cox (1987) points to the decline in the split voting rate following
the expansion of the franchise, from 20 percent to three percent, as strong ev-
idence of growing partisan-based voting by the electorate (p. 103). Another
conclusion that one can draw, however, is that since the split rate was only 20
percent prior to the ﬁrst reform act, most voters even before reform did not
generally cast split votes. Moreover, the split rate fell slowly in the early years
following reform, when consistent policy diﬀerences among parties were already
in evidence. If parties had not been credible vehicles for the communication of
policy diﬀerences, this early pattern would not have been in evidence.
Finally, even before electoral reform government policies were in place to
limit clientelism. MPs could expect to inﬂuence only personal legislation (e.g.,
resolving the estate issues of local nobles) and government employment of fa-
vored individuals. Pork barrel politics — targeted infrastructure — was relatively
unknown, for example, compared to the US in the nineteenth century (Cox,
1987, p. 133) or to most developing country democracies today. There were
also eﬀorts to restrain patronage prior to reform. O’Gorman (2001) notes that
reforms of the civil service were already begun under William Pitt in the late
18th century, well before the ﬁrst Reform Act, and continued under Lord Liv-
erpool’s government in the early nineteenth century (O’Gorman, p. 59 — 62).
Eﬀorts were made to conduct poor relief on a more technocratic basis than is
common in young democracies. In the 1830s, “[T]he followers of Jeremy Ben-
tham persuaded the Poor Law Commissioners to appoint only on merit and
after interview. Even more spectacular, under the inﬂuence of James and John
Stuart Mill, the India Oﬃce was comprehensively reformed on utilitarian lines”
(O’Gorman, p. 63-4). Such policies would not have been reasonable if polit-
ical competitors could not make credible policy commitments to voters. This
meant that politicians could rely on promises of public good spending or other
broad policy promises to have a suﬃciently large eﬀect on welfare to focus their
campaigns on them (H3(g) was large).
Taken together, the conditions on the eve of electoral reform in Great Britain
permitted political competitors to make credible policy promises to the growing
electorate. Of course, with a small electorate vote-buying was still an attractive
option even for credible parties. However, as the franchise expanded, party
30leaders found it increasingly advantageous to emphasize issue-based legislation
and to combat the inﬂuence of party members in Parliament whose appeal to
constituents was more individual or clientelist.
The Dominican Republic, a more recent island democracy, stands in sharp
contrast. Democracy emerged after decades of rule by Rafael Trujillo, one of
the more ruthless dictators of the twentieth century. His regime had two char-
acteristics that are relevant for this discussion and that distinguish it from the
pre-reform political environment in England: individuals or political organi-
zations outside the regime could not develop a reputation for policy stances
independent of those of the regime; and Trujillo pervasively and systematically
used targeted and personalized transfers to maintain support.
Following the assassination of Trujillo in 1961, elections took place in 1962
with two principal parties, one closely allied with the economic elite that bene-
ﬁted from the Trujillo regime, and the other the leader of the Partido Revolu-
cionario Dominicano, formed in exile in opposition to the regime. The latter,
Juan Bosch, won the elections, only to be expelled seven months later in a mil-
itary coup. The Bosch victory is not particularly surprising: following such a
regime, voters have little faith that the clientelist arrangements of the dictator-
ship will be preserved, vested as they were in the personality of Trujillo, so the
only basis for pre-electoral politics was the candidate stance on the dictator-
ship — pure ideology, in other words, in a situation where the ideological bias
was signiﬁcantly towards one of the competitors. Elections took place again in
1966. Bosch competed in this election but lost to Joaquin Balaguer, a long-time
associate of Trujillo.
Balaguer’s election in 1966 almost surely had little to do with the analysis in
this paper and more to do with the foreign policy of the United States. However,
his subsequent conduct in oﬃce and the strategies adopted by the PRD pres-
idents who eventually succeeded him, are entirely consistent with the analysis
here. Balaguer won three successive elections, in 1966, 1970 and 1974. Neither
he nor his political competitors had established reputations inside the Domini-
can Republic with respect to policies other than participation in or opposition
to the dictatorship. For decades under Trujillo, social and economic exchanges
were structured only to maximize the personal inﬂuence of the dictator.
There is substantial evidence that Balaguer responded to these initial con-
ditions by building up his clientelist base. Observers point to his continuous
attention to every detail of budget implementation, consistent with an eﬀort
to retain and build personally loyal networks of clients (Ceara, 1996, 41). One
31legislator said, perhaps exaggerating but nevertheless making the point, that
Balaguer did not talk to his ﬁnance minister implying that any eﬀort to dele-
gate budget implementation risked either the misallocation of expenditures to
purposes or voters other than his preferred targets, or the misallocation of credit
away from him (author interview). When he died in July 2002 at the age of
95, The Economist magazine noted these salient features of his approach to
government: in 1989, he personally controlled more than half of the government
budget, siphoning oﬀ 95 percent of it in some years to a half dozen friends; like
Trujillo, on weekends he traveled to villages to hand out bicycles and to monitor
the state of public works.
PRD candidates ﬁnally won the elections of 1978 and 1982. Their behavior,
however, mirrored that of Balaguer. PRD presidents focused intensely on tar-
geted spending and the construction of a clientelist base. Presidents Gúzman
and Blanco raised public sector employment by 50 percent and 40 percent, re-
spectively and did little to establish a reputation for policy or broad public good
provision (Kryzanek and Wiarda 1988, 106). Economic conditions deteriorated,
jeopardizing their ability to sustain clientelist relationships. Since party plat-
forms diﬀered little and personal clienteles were key to political competition,
intra-party competition was ﬁerce and party disintegration provided an opening
for Balaguer to return to oﬃce in 1986 and 1990. Even then, as a man in his 80s
and blind, he resumed his energetic and personalistic approach to maintaining
support.
There are two further indications that the legacy of ruthless dictatorship
slows subsequent democratic development by raising the returns to clientelism
and suppressing the development of policy reputations. First, as late as 1996, 35
years after the death of Trujillo, party identities and reputations were suﬃciently
ill-deﬁned that Balaguer’s endorsement was suﬃcient to tip the presidential
election in favor of Leonel Fernández, a political newcomer who had worked for
as i g n i ﬁcant period of time outside of the Dominican Republic and who headed a
small party. Second, the teachers’ union — a partisan actor in nearly all mature
democracies — refuses to endorse any party in the Dominican Republic. It has
a board of directors with members from both major parties and ﬁnds favor
with neither (author interviews). This is consistent with a country in which
issue-based political competition is less important. Not surprisingly, the ratio
of education spending to public investment is lower in the Dominican Republic
than in nearly all other Latin American countries.
324.3 Extending the analysis: property rights, abandoned
infrastructure, and party machines
Potential extensions of the analysis may explain other notable development phe-
nomena. One relates to the security of property rights. Clague, et al. (1996)
show that younger democracies provide less secure property rights and grow
more slowly than older democracies, and than autocracies with long-tenured
leaders. The analysis in this paper suggests how one might explain this. Polit-
ical competitors are less able to make credible promises in young democracies,
rely disproportionately on private transfers to secure electoral support, and see
less electoral beneﬁtf r o mb r o a d l yb e n e ﬁcial, growth-maximizing policies, such
as refraining from expropriation. Similarly, patrons, who may actually be the
guarantors of property rights security for their clients, have little to gain and
may lose from asking their clients to support candidates who promise to usurp
their role and strengthen property rights. Generally, to the extent that it is
diﬃcult to exclude citizens from an umbrella of secure property rights — and,
almost by deﬁnition, secure property rights become insecure to the extent that
all citizens are not under the umbrella — parties seeking to build credibility voter
by voter have less incentive to resist expropriation.
Such an explanation would be complementary to other analyses that em-
phasize the importance of formal institutions in protecting property rights.
For example, North and Weingast (1989), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2001) and Clague, et al. (1996) justiﬁably emphasize the importance of po-
litical checks and balances as constraints on attempts by politicians to renege
on their promises. However, nearly all young democracies exhibit similar in-
stitutional checks and balances as older democracies; what may diﬀer are the
incentives of the veto players to engage in expropriation in the ﬁrst place.
A second widespread phenomenon, analyzed by Robinson and Torvik (2002)
and others, is that of abandoned white elephants: useless infrastructure that
stands half-completed. The phenomenon of abandoned infrastructure is, in-
deed, common. For example, one high oﬃcial in the ruling government of
President Hipolito Mejía of the Dominican Republic claimed that hundreds of
projects that were begun by the government of Joaquin Balaguer, two govern-
ments before, were then paralyzed under the Leonel Fernández government.
Other observers noted that incomplete projects from the Fernández government
were similarly halted under Mejía (author interviews). However, although some
of the paralyzed projects appear to have been of the value-subtracting type
33analyzed by Robinson and Torvik, most were not. They were instead class-
room buildings on crowded university campuses, public housing, and roads that
were no less eﬃcient than projects started and ﬁnished by the prior government
during its term in oﬃce.
Robinson and Torvik (2002) argue that abandoned projects are to be ex-
pected in countries where politicians cannot make credible promises and have
an aﬃnity for some voting groups over others. Under these circumstances, the
incumbent may have an incentive to start, but not ﬁnish, a value-subtracting
project beneﬁting a favored group. This allows him to attract the votes of
this group because his opponent, unlike the incumbent, lacks an aﬃnity for the
group and has no incentive to ﬁnish value-subtracting projects. The discussion
in this paper provides a basis for an explanation of why projects with positive
economic value are abandoned by new governments where there does not seem
to be an aﬃnity between beneﬁciary groups and the political party. Politicians
build infrastructure in response to promises to voters they organize; if diﬀerent
politicians organize diﬀerent voters, they have incentives to build and complete
infrastructure projects beneﬁting "their" voters and to leave incompleted those
infrastructure projects begun and not ﬁnished by predecessors.8
The Dominican Republic illustrates this line of analysis. If political party
A disappears, replaced by another with no particular advantage in organizing
the groups that A could organize at low cost, we would expect both parties
to begin to organize A’s voters and for incompleted infrastructure beneﬁting
A’s voters to be completed. In fact, the government of Hipolito Mejía of the
Dominican Republic, which took oﬃce in 2000, proudly re-started many of the
projects begun under the presidency of Joaquin Balaguer, who died at the age
of 95 in mid-2002. With his death imminent, Balaguer’s promises to clients
were not credible and it was politically worthwhile for the Mejía government
8The model in this paper predicts that competitors attempt to organize the same vot-
ers. Two additional assumptions would give them incentives to organize diﬀerent voters.
First, parties confront asymmetric costs across groups of voters in laying the preconditions for
credible commitment. Party A confronts lower costs with some groups than party B,p a r t y
B lower costs with other groups, and for still other groups the parties have the same costs.
Second, all voters incur costs of voting, along the lines of Robinson and Torvik’s assumption
that oﬀers of public sector employment are only attractive to clients whose private sector
reservation wage is suﬃciently low. With these modiﬁcations, the following conclusions are
possible: ﬁrst, parties make larger promises to those voters for whom they both compete;
smaller promises to those for whom they do not compete, but at least suﬃcient to oﬀset the
costs of voting. The second group of voters, for example, could receive the promise that
infrastructure projects will be the last to be started, and therefore not necessarily ﬁnished.
Those projects are eventually ﬁnished only if the party that organizes these voters at low cost
remains in power; if the other party then takes power, it has no incentive to ﬁnish them.
34to attempt to capture Balaguer’s clients by ﬁnishing projects begun under his
government but halted by all successor governments. The Mejía government
did not, however, make any eﬀort to ﬁnish the incomplete projects begun by its
immediate predecessor, the government of President Fernández, who was very
much alive and active.
Finally, the analysis here may oﬀer a potential alternative explanation to
that of Dixit and Londregan (1996) for the party machines that emerged in
American cities in the 19th century. Machine politics focused in large measure
on the organization of newly arrived immigrants to US cities. These new arrivals
were unlikely to regard political promises by any party as credible, though this is
assumed in the Dixit and Londregan (1996) analysis. The explanation suggested
by the analysis here for the organization of these immigrants is consistent with
the Dixit and Londregan story but is valid in an environment in which political
parties are not credible. First, new arrivals were more ideologically neutral,
especially new arrivals to cities. On the one hand, new immigrants were most
likely to have been indiﬀerent to the ideological distinctions between the parties.
On the other hand, the ideological debates that distinguished US parties at the
national level had little salience in many cities. The model above predicts
that politicians will make the strongest eﬀorts to organize, via party machines,
precisely these types of voters, when their promises are generally not credible.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Since the 1970s, scholars of politics and social relationships in developing coun-
tries have emphasized patron-client forms of organization. Many have drawn
t h ec o n c l u s i o nt h a ts o m es o c i e t i e sa r em ore vulnerable to domination by clien-
telist patterns of interaction, leading inevitably to government failure to provide
for the broader public good. However, the eﬀorts of these scholars have demon-
strated as well the importance to clientelism of face-to-face, repeated exchanges
between individuals. The analysis in this paper takes a step back and shows
how reliance on face-to-face, repeated exchanges can emerge in politics when
political parties are unable to make credible promises to voters.
The consequences of such reliance vary, depending on whether politicians
develop personal reputations with voters directly or rely on patrons — interme-
diaries who can forge credible relations with both voters and politicians. Re-
liance on patrons reduces public good provision, but has an ambiguous eﬀect on
35rents and transfers. Reliance on patrons also suppresses incentives to develop
credible political organizations, stunting democratic development. Whether
patrons are present or not, however, the requirement that politicians expend
resources to build credibility leads to increased reliance on targeted transfers
and greater rent-seeking. The analysis provides an explanation for several dis-
parate, important phenomena: the greater corruption and public investment
in young democracies relative to older democracies; successful democratization
in England compared to the less successful democratization of a more typical
developing democracy, the Dominican Republic; and potentially the insecurity
of property rights in young democracies, the emergence of machine politics and
the abandonment of worthwhile infrastrucure projects.
More broadly, the eﬀects of credibility on political competition, and partic-
ularly the eﬀects of clientelism on policy outcomes, should cut across political
institutions. The reliance by voters on promises by individuals with whom they
have a personal relationship should be an important driver of political competi-
tion independent of whether electoral systems are majoritarian or proportional
and whether political regimes are presidential or parliamentary, and regardless
of whether there are political checks and balances. A fruitful line of future
research would be to ask how the pursuit of credibility by politicians aﬀects the
relationship between institutions and policy outcomes such as spending and the
security of property rights.
36Appendix: Endogenous credibility using "never
believe again" punishments
The main argument here is that politicians need to spend resources in order
to make credible agreements with voters. Those resources, in the main models,
are assumed suﬃcient to actually buy credibility. However, the policy outcomes
in the costly credibility cases can be supported in an inﬁnitely repeated game
in which credibility is not assumed. Consider the inﬁnite repetition of the
following stage game:
1) Candidates simultaneously make electoral promises (pA,pB).







3) Voters cast votes for their preferred candidates.
4) The elected candidate implements policy x.
Let q =( τ,g,f(m),n,r).
q0 = policy of pure rent-seeking (i.e. q0 =( 1 ,0,0,0,N)), where the tax
rate is 100 percent and rents are equal to N, the total income of the society;
q1 = policy of the committed candidate in a static game in which only
one candidate can commit to his electoral promises;
q2 = common (Nash equilibrium) policy of a static game in which both
candidates can commit to their electoral promises;
P(qA,qB)=probability that A wins the elections when voters expect
that policies qA and qB will be implemented by candidates A and B respectively
β = common discount factor, 0 < β < 1.
As in Aragones and Postlewaite (2000), candidates will be said to have a
"bad" reputation in a given electoral period if they reneged on their electoral
promises at least once in the past. Candidates have a "good" reputation if
they have always kept their promises in the past. We claim that strategies that
support the policy outcome of the static game with commitment, q2 are the
following. In every period in which both candidates have a good reputation,
they promise p = q2 and implement x = q2 if elected. In an electoral period
in which one has a good reputation and the opponent a bad reputation, the
candidate with a good reputation promises p = q1 and implements x = q1 if
elected, whereas the candidate with a bad reputation makes a random promise
and implements pure rent seeking if elected. In periods when both candidates
have a bad reputation, they make a random promise and implement x = q0.
Citizens vote based on a candidate’s promise if the candidate has never reneged
on promises in the past — if the candidate has a good reputation. Otherwise,
they vote based on the candidate’s ideal policy q0.
37We show below that the voter punishment strategy can be eﬀective in deter-
ring reneging if both candidates have good reputations (for example, in the ﬁrst
period of this game), or if one candidate has a good reputation and one has a
b a dr e p u t a t i o n( o ﬀ the equilibrium path of this game), as long as the electoral
advantage gained by complying with promises is suﬃcient to oﬀset the lower
rents that accrue from the strategy of pure rent-seeking. This is the case, as
usual, as long as candidates place a suﬃciently high value on future rents.
Claim 1 The strategies above constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium of the








(N − r2)+( R + γr2)1
2 − (R + γN)P(q0,q1)
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≥ (R + γN)P(q0,q1).
Proof. We need to verify that for each player his strategy is optimal given
the strategies of the other players and following any history of play. It is im-
mediate that voters’ strategies are optimal since they prescribe voting behavior
based on the correct beliefs about the policy to be implemented by the winning
candidate. We need to know, therefore, the conditions under which comply-
ing with promises and refraining from pure rent-seeking is the optimal response
of candidates to voter strategies, depending on whether candidates both have
good reputations (along the equilibrium path) or whether only one has a good
reputation (oﬀ the equilibrium path). To see that the candidates’ strategies
are subgame perfect, let:
vbb = a candidate’s expected utility in the next electoral period if he has a
bad reputation given that his opponent has a bad reputation.
vbb =( R + γN)P(q0,q0)
=( R + γN)
1
2
Both candidates promise, and the winner implements, a policy of pure rent-
38seeking; candidates have a 50 percent probability of winning.
vgb = a candidate’s expected utility in the next electoral period if he has a
good reputation given that his opponent has a bad reputation.
vgb =( R + γr1)P(q1,q0)
The candidate with the good reputation promises q1, the candidate with a bad
reputation promises q0, the good reputation candidate wins with probability
P(q0,q1), earning the corresponding pecuniary and non-pecuniary rents.
vbg = a candidate’s expected utility in the next electoral period if he has a
bad reputation given that his opponent has a good reputation.
vbg =( R + γN)P(q0,q1)
The candidate with the bad reputation promises q0, the candidate with a bad
reputation promises q1, the good reputation candidate wins with probability
P(q0,q1), taking all the income in society as rents if he is elected.
vgg = a candidate’s expected utility in the next electoral period if he has a
good reputation given that his opponent has a good reputation.
vgg =( R + γr2)P(q2,q2)




Each candidate has a good reputation, promises q2, win with 50 percent prob-
ability, and, if elected, earns rents r2. The fact that these expected values
are common to both candidates follows immediately from the symmetry of the
game; also notice that
P(qA,qB)=1− P(qB,qA).
Consider now a winning candidate’s decision in the oﬃce (implementation)
stage. Suppose that he has a bad reputation while his defeated opponent has a
bad reputation as well. Given voters’ equilibrium strategies — to base their vot-
ing decision entirely on the candidates’ preferred outcomes (pure rent-seeking)
rather than on their promises when the candidates have a bad reputation — it is
optimal for the incumbent to pursue pure rent-seeking. Now consider an elec-
toral period in which the incumbent has a good reputation while his opponent
39has a bad reputation. The incumbent will ﬁnd it optimal to keep his reputation








That is, the incumbent implements his promised policy only if the rents from
doing so, including the present value of the ﬂow of rents from being the only
candidate with a good reputation, are greater than rents from reneging, taking
all income in the form of rents in the current period and enjoying rents in the
future that accrue to both candidates when both have bad reputations. By the
same logic, if in a given electoral period both candidates have a good reputation

















(N − r2)+( R + γr2)1
2 − (R + γN)P(q0,q1)
.
Because the discount factor satisﬁes 0 < β < 1, these two conditions can only
be fulﬁlled if the denominator in each equation meets the ﬁnal two conditions in
the claim above. For example, equation (11) holds if and only if (R+γr2)1
2 ≥
(R + γN)P(q0,q1). This is the conclusion foreshadowed earlier: incumbents
with good reputations fulﬁll promises where the probability of winning future
elections is suﬃciently low for the incumbent who reneges and takes the rents
that accrue from pure rent-seeking.
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